We construct non-associative key establishment protocols for all left self-distributive (LD), multi-LD-, and other left distributive systems. Instantiations of these protocols using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups lead to instances of a natural and apparently new group-theoretic problem, which we call the (subgroup) conjugacy coset problem.
Introduction
In an effort to construct new key establishment protocols (KEPs), which are hopefully harder to break than previously proposed non-commutative schemes, the first author introduced in his PhD thesis [5] (see also [6] ) the first non-associative generalization of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) KEP [1] , which revolutionized the field of non-commutative public key cryptography (PKC) more than ten years ago. For an introduction to non-commutative public key cryptography we refer to the book by Myasnikov, Shpilrain and Ushakov [14] . For further motivation and on non-associative PKC we refer to [6] . It turns out (see [6] ) that in the context of AAG-like KEPs for magmas, left self-distributive systems (LD-systems) and their generalizations (like multi-LD-systems) naturally occur. Though we constructed several examples of KEPs for non-associative LD-and multi-LD-systems [6] , we did not provide a general method to construct a KEP that works for all LD-and multi-LD-systems. We fill this gap in the present paper. With this method at hand any LD-or multi-LD-system automatically provides a KEP -while in [5, 6] we
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(3) A classical example of an LD-system is .G; / where G is a group equipped with the conjugacy operation x y D x 1 yx (or x rev y D xyx 1 ). Note that such an LD-system cannot be free, because conjugacy satisfies additionally the idempotency law x x D x.
(4) Finite groups equipped with the conjugacy operation are not the only finite LD-systems. Indeed, the so-called Laver tables provide the classical example for finite LD-systems. There exists for each n 2 N an unique LD-system L n D .¹1; 2; : : : ; 2 n º; / with k 1 D k C 1. The values for k l with l ¤ 1 can be computed by induction using the left self-distributive law. The Laver tables for n D 1; 2; 3 are as follows.
L 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 Laver tables are also described in [2] .
Many examples for LD-, bi-LD-and multi-LD-systems are given in Dehornoy's monograph [2] .
f -conjugacy
One may consider several generalizations of the conjugacy operation as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an ansatz like
x y D f .x 1 /g.y/h.x/ for some group endomorphisms f; g; h. (1)
Proof. A straightforward computation yields
.ˇ / D f .˛ 1 /gf .ˇ 1 /g 2 . /gh.ˇ/h.˛/;
.˛ ˇ/ .˛ / D f h.˛ 1 /fg.ˇ 1 /f 2 .˛/gf .˛ 1 /g 2 . /gh.˛/ hf .˛ 1 /hg.ˇ/h 2 .˛/:
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion.
The simplest solution of the system of equations (1) is f D g and h D id. This leads to the following definition. 
For any non-trivial endomorphism f , the relation ! f does not define an equivalence relation on G. Even the relation ! , defined by u ! v if and only if there exists an f 2 Aut.G/ such that u ! f v, is not an equivalence relation. Indeed, transitivity requires the automorphisms (relation must be symmetric!) to be an idempotent endomorphism (
Compare the notion of f -LD-conjugacy with the well-known notion f -twisted conjugacy defined by u f v (for f 2 Aut.G/) if and only if there exists a c 2 G such that v D f .c 1 /uc DW c tw f u, which yields indeed an equivalence relation. On the other hand, the operation tw D tw f is not LD -rather it satisfies the following "near" LD-law:
where˛f is short for f .˛/.
Anyway, it follows directly from the definitions that u ! v if and only if f .u/ f v, i.e., any f -LD conjugacy problem reduces to a twisted conjugacy problem and vice versa. Here we have to extend the notion of twisted conjugacy from f 2 Aut.G/ to all f 2 End.G/.
Example 2.6. Recall that the n-strand braid group B n is generated by 1 ; : : : ; n 1 where inside i the .i C 1/-th strand crosses over the i -th strand. There exists a natural epimorphism from the group B n onto the symmetric group S n , defined by i 7 ! .i; i C 1/. Let G be the kernel of this epimorphism, namely the n-strand pure braid group P n . For some small integer d 1, consider the epimorphism Á d W P n ! P n d given by "pulling out" (or erasing) the last d strands, i.e., the strands n d C 1; : : : ; n. Consider now the shift map @ W B n 1 ! B n , defined by i 7 ! i C1 , and note that @ d .P n d / Ä P n . Now, we define the endomorphism f W P n ! P n by the composition f D @ d ı Á d .
Shifted conjugacy
Patrick Dehornoy introduced the following generalization of f -conjugacy, and he points out that once the definition of shifted conjugacy is used, braids inevitably appear [2, 3] . Hence the subgroup H D h¹f n .a/ j n 2 Nºi of G is a homomorphic image of the braid group
with infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is a quotient of B 1 .
There exists a straightforward generalization of Proposition 2.7 for multi-LDsystems:
Proposition 2.8. Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of endomorphisms .f i / i 2I of G and a set of fixed elements ¹a i 2 G j i 2 I º. Then .G;
Proof. A straightforward computation gives
y/x:
Note that this proof also contains proofs of Proposition 2.7 (setting jI j D 1) and of the following Corollary 2.9 (setting G D B 1 , I D ¹1; 2º, s D @, 1 D , 2 D N , a 1 D 1 and a 2 D 1 1 ). Consider the injective shift endomorphism @ W B 1 ! B 1 defined by i 7 ! i C1 for all i 1. is a bi-LD-system. In particular, .B 1 ; / is an LD-system.
Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups
In the following we consider generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations in B 1 . Therefore we set s D @ p for some p 2 N, and we choose a i 2 B 2p for all i 2 I such that a i @ p .a i /a j D @ p .a j /a i @ p .a i / for all i; j 2 I:
Since a i 2 B 2p , we have OEa i ; @ 2p .x/ D 1 for all x 2 B 1 . Thus the conditions of Proposition 2.8 are fulfilled, and x i y D x@ p .y/a i @ p .x 1 / defines a multi-LDstructure on B 1 . For jI j D 1, p D 1 and a D 1 , which implies H D B 1 , we get Dehornoy's original definition of shifted conjugacy . It remains to give some natural solutions ¹a i 2 B 2p j i 2 I º of the equation set (1). Note that in case jI j D 1 (notation: a 1 D a), of course, every endomorphism f of B 1 with f . 1 / 2 B 2p provides such solution a D f . 1 /. Definition 2.10 ([2, Definition I.4.6]). Let, for n 2, ı n D n 1 2 1 . For p; q 1, we set p;q D ı pC1 @.ı pC1 / @ q 1 .ı pC1 /:
Since a D ˙1 p;p 2 B 2p fulfills a@ p .a/a D @ p .a/a@ p .a/, it provides a lot of (multi)-LD-structures on B 1 . Proposition 2.11. The following statements hold:
(a) The binary operation
x a y D @ p .x 1 /a@ p .y/x with a D a 0 p;p a 00 for some a 0 ; a 00 2 B p yields an LD-structure on B 1 if and only if OEa 0 ; a 00 D 1.
(b) Let I be an index set. The binary operations
with a i D a 0 i p;p a 00 i for some a 0 i ; a 00 i 2 B p (i 2 I ) yields a multi-LD-structure on B 1 if and only if OEa 0 i ; a 0 j D OEa 0 i ; a 00 j D 1 for all i; j 2 I . (Note that a 00 i and a 00 j need not commute for i ¤ j .) (c) The binary operations
with a 1 D a 0 1 p;p a 00 1 , a 2 D a 0 2 1 p;p a 00 2 for some a 0 1 ; a 00 1 ; a 0 2 ; a 00 2 2 B p yields a bi-LD-structure on B 1 if and only if OEa 0 1 ; a 00 1 D OEa 0 2 ; a 00 2 D OEa 0 1 ; a 00 2 D OEa 0 2 ; a 00 1 D OEa 0 1 ; a 0 2 D 1: (Note that a 00 1 and a 00 2 need not commute.) We see that there exist infinitely many (multi)-LD-structures on B N . Further examples are provided by Proposition 2.12, which, of course, admits a lot of variations and generalizations. Proposition 2.12. Let be p; p 1 ; p 2 2 N with p 1 C p 2 D p. The binary operation x a y D @ p .x 1 /a@ p .y/x with a D a 0 1 @ p 1 .a 0 2 /@ p 1 . p 2 ;p / 1 p;p 1 a 00 1 @ p 1 .a 00 2 / for some a 0 1 ; a 00 1 2 B p 1 , a 0 2 ; a 00 2 2 B p 2 yields an LD-structure on B 1 if and only if OEa 0 1 ; a 00 1 D OEa 0 2 ; a 00 2 D 1. The proofs of Proposition 2.11 and 2.12 are straightforward computations. The reader is recommended to draw some pictures.
Yet another group-based LD-system
Though we are sure that it must have been well known to experts, we have not been able to find the following natural LD-operation for groups in the literature. For a group G, .G; ı/ is an LD-system with x ı y D xy 1 x:
Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation , for this "symmetric decomposition" or conjugacy operation ı, the corresponding relation ! ı , defined by x ! ı y if and only if there exists a c 2 G such that y D c ı x, is not an equivalence relation. In particular, ! ı is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive.
One may consider several generalizations of this symmetric conjugacy operation ı, as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an ansatz like x ı y D f .x/g.y 1 /h.x/ for some group endomorphisms f; g; h.
Proposition 2.13. Let G be a group, and f; g; h 2 End.G/. Then the binary operation x ı y D f .x/ g.y 1 / h.x/ yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
Proof. A straightforward computation yields
.
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. (i) Then the binary operations ı f and f (and rev f ), defined by
are distributive over ı. In particular ( rev ) is distributive over ı. In short, the following equations hold: 3 Key establishment for all LD-systems 3 .
The protocol
Recall that a magma is a set M equipped with a binary operation, say , which is possibly non-associative. For our purposes all interesting LD-systems are nonassociative. Consider an element y of a magma .M; / which is an iterated product of other elements in M . Such an element can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements y 1 ; : : : ; y k 2 M . We use the notation y D T .y 1 ; : : : ; y k /. Here the subscript tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation . Consider, for example, the element y D ..b c/ .a b// b. The corresponding labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the following figure.
Non-associative key establishment for left distributive systems 
We are going to describe a KEP that applies to any LD-system .L; /. There are two public submagmas S A D hs 1 ;
; s m i , S B D ht 1 ; ; t n i of .L; /, assigned to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps. Proof. We have
We are going to describe a KEP that applies to any LD-system .L; /. There are two public submagmas S A D hs 1 ; : : : ; s m i , S B D ht 1 ; : : : ; t n i of .L; /, assigned to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps. Protocol 1. Key establishment for any LD-system .L; /.
(1) Alice generates her secret key .a 0 ; a/ 2 S A L, and Bob chooses his secret key b 2 S B .
(2) Alice computes the elements a t 1 ; : : : ; a t n ; p 0 D a a 0 2 L, and sends them to Bob. Bob computes b s 1 ; : : : ; b s m 2 L, and sends them to Alice. (4) Alice computes K A D a .b a 0 /. Bob gets the shared key by
This protocol is an asymmetric modification of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocols for magmas introduced in [5, 6] . 
Base problems
In order to break Protocol 1 an attacker has to find the shared key 
In order to break Protocol 1 an attacker has to find the shared key K D K A D K B . Note that in our context, b comes from a restricted domain, namely S A Â L. This might affect distributions when one considers possible attacks. Nevertheless, we use the notion of (simultaneous) LD-problem for inputs generated by potentially arbitrary b 2 L. Similar remarks affect base problems further in the text.
Even if an attacker finds Bob's original key b or a pseudo-key b 0 (solution to the m-simLDP above), then she still faces the following problem.
-MSP ( -submagma Membership Search Problem):
INPUT: t 1 ; : : : ; t n 2 .L; /, b 2 ht 1 ; : : : ; t n i . OBJECTIVE: Find an expression of b as a tree-word in the submagma ht 1 ; : : : ; t n i (notation b D T .u 1 ; : : : ; u k / for u i 2 ¹t j º j Än ). In particular, we have b 0 a 0 D b a 0 . We feed this pseudo-key b 0 into a -MSP oracle for S B which returns a treeword T 0 .u 1 ; : : : ; u l / D b 0 (for some l 2 N and u i 2 ¹t j º j Än ). Now compute Note that here the situation is asymmetric -an attack on Alice's secret key requires the solution of the following problem.
n-modsimLDP (Modified n-simultaneous LD-problem): INPUT: An element p 0 2 L and pairs .t 1 ; t 0 1 /; : : : ; .t n ; t 0 n / 2 L 2 with t 0 i D a t i 81 Ä i Ä n for some (unknown) a 2 L. OBJECTIVE: Find elements a 0 0 ; a 0 2 L such that p 0 D a 0 a 0 0 and a 0 t i D t 0 i for all i D 1; : : : ; n.
Also here, even if an attacker finds Alice's original key .a 0 ; a/ or a pseudo-key .a 0 0 ; a 0 / 2 S A L, then she still faces a -submagma Membership Search Problem. Proposition 3.3. Let .L; / be an LD-system. We shall define the generalized n-modsimLDP for S A Â L as a modified n-simultaneous LD-problem with the objective to find a 0 2 L and a 0 0 in S A D hs 1 ; : : : ; s m i such that a 0 t i D t 0 i for all i Ä n.
An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP and -MSP for S A is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice's private key. The generalized n-simLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key .a 0 0 ; a 0 / 0 2 S A L such that a 0 a 0 0 D p 0 and a 0 t i D a 0 i D a t i for all i D 1; : : : ; n. Observe that this implies for any element e B 2 S B that a 0 e B D a e B . In particular, we have a 0 b D a b. We feed the first component a 0 0 2 S A of this pseudokey into a -MSP oracle for S A which returns a treeword T 0 .r 1 ; : : : ; r l / D a 0 0 (for some l 2 N and r i 2 ¹s j º j Äm ). Now, we compute Both approaches described above require the solution of a -submagma Membership Search Problem. Note that we assumed that the generalized m-simLDP (resp. n-modsimLDP) oracle already provides a pseudo-key in the submagma S B (resp. S A ) which we feed to the -MSP oracle. But to check whether an element lies in some submagma, i.e., the -submagma Membership Decision Problem, is already undecidable in general.
Fortunately, for the attacker, there are approaches which do not resort to solving the -MSP.
Recall that we defined the generalized m-simLDP for S B Â L as an m-simultaneous LD-problem with the objective to find a b 0 in S B D ht 1 ; : : : ; t n i such that b 0 s i D s 0 i for all i Ä m. Proposition 3.4. A generalized simLDP oracle is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized m-simLDP for S B and the n-simLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys -though we need only a pseudo-key for the second component a 0 of Alice's key. The n-simLDP oracle provides a 0 2 L such that a 0 t j D t 0 j D a t j for all j Ä n. The generalized m-simLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key b 0 
Recall that we defined the generalized n-modsimLDP for S A Â L as an n-simultaneous LD-problem with the objective to find a a 0 0 in S A D hs 1 ; : : : ; s m i such that a 0 t i D t 0 i for all i Ä n. Proposition 3.5. An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP for S A and the m-simLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys. The m-simLDP oracle provides b 0 2 L such that b 0 s j D s 0 j D b s j for all j Ä m. The generalized n-modsimLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key .a 0 Here we describe a generalization of Protocol 1 that works for all multi-LDsystems. Actually, it suffices if L is only a partial multi- 
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system .L; O A [ O B / as described above. We have two subsets of public elements ¹s 1 ;
; s m º and ¹t 1 ;
; t n º of L. Also, recall that S A D hs 1 ; ; s m i O A and S B D ht 1 ; ; t n i O B . Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps. 
e ˇTOA .e 1 ; : : : ; e l / D T O A .e ˇe1 ; : : : ; e ˇel /:
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system .L; O A [ O B / as described above. We have two subsets of public elements ¹s 1 ; : : : ; s m º and ¹t 1 ; : : : ; t n º of L. Also, recall that S A D hs 1 ; : : : ; s m i O A and S B D ht 1 ; : : : ; t n i O B . Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps. (2) Alice computes the elements a ˛t1 ; : : : ; a ˛tn ; p 0 D a ˛a0 2 L and sends them to Bob. Bob computes the elements b ˇs1 ; : : : ; b ˇsm 2 L, and sends them to Alice. 
In order to break Protocol 2 an attacker has to find the shared key K D K A D K B . A successful attack on Bob's secret key .b; ˇ/ requires (first) the solution of the following problem. In order to clarify concepts we introduce the following notation, which also makes it easier to name our base problems at hand. For e 2 L, let e;˛. x/ WD e ˛x . Then, for ˛2 O A , e;˛i s by (4) a magma homomorphism on S B . Analogeously, for ˇ2 O B , e;ˇ2 End.S A / by (5) . Now, we may reformulate the base problem for obtaining a pseudo-key on Bob's secret. 
In order to break Protocol 2 an attacker has to find the shared key K D K A D K B . A successful attack on Bob's secret key .b; ˇ/ requires (first) the solution of the following problem.
INPUT: Element pairs .s 1 ; s 0 1 /; : : : ; .s m ; s 0
In order to clarify concepts we introduce the following notation, which also makes it easier to name our base problems at hand. For e 2 L, let e;˛. x/ WD e ˛x :
Then, for ˛2 O A , e;˛i s by (4) a magma homomorphism on S B . Analogously, for ˇ2 O B , e;ˇ2 End.S A / by (5) . Now, we may reformulate the base problem for obtaining a pseudo-key on Bob's secret.
LDEndP Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice's private key. The generalized modLDEndP oracle provides a pseudo-key .a 0 0 ; a 0 ;˛0 / 2 S A End.S B / such that a 0 ;˛0 .t i / D t 0 i D a;˛. t i / for all i D 1; : : : ; n and a 0 ;˛0 .a 0 0 / D p 0 . Observe that this implies for any element e B 2 S B that a 0 ;˛0 .e B / D a;˛. e B /. In particular, we have a 0 ;˛0 .b/ D a;˛. b/. Since a 0 0 2 S A , we may feed a 0 0 into an O A -MSP oracle for S A which returns a tree-word T 0 O A .r 1 ; : : : ; r l / D a 0 0 (for some l 2 N and r i 2 ¹s j º j Äm ). Now, we may compute
Now, we describe approaches to break Protocol 2 which do not resort to solving a submagma-MSP. Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys -though we do not require a pseudo-key for the first component a 0 of Alice's key. The LDEndP oracle for S B provides a 0 ;˛0 such that a 0 ;˛0 .t j / D t 0 j D a;˛. t j / for all j Ä n. The generalized LDEndP oracle for .S A ; S B / returns the pseudo-key endomor-
Alternatively, one may choose the following approach. Remark 4.5. Note that in the non-associative setting the case m D n D 1 is of particular interest, i.e., we may abandon simultaneity in our base problems since the submagmas generated by one element are still complicated objects.
Instantiations using shifted conjugacy 5.1 Protocol 1
Consider the infinite braid group .B 1 ; / with shifted conjugacy as LD-operation. Then the LD-problem is a simultaneous shifted conjugacy problem. For m D n D 1 this becomes the shifted conjugacy problem (see, e.g., [3] ) which was first solved in [7] by a double reduction, first to the subgroup conjugacy problem for B n 1 in B n , then to an instance of the simultaneous conjugacy problem. For the simultaneous conjugacy problem in braid groups we refer to [9, 11] . If we replace shifted conjugacy by generalized shifted conjugacy, then the corresponding LD-problem still reduces to a subgroup conjugacy problem for a standard parabolic subgroup of a braid group. Such problems were first solved in a more general framework, namely for Garside subgroups of Garside groups, in [8] . Though not explicitly stated in [7, 8] , the simultaneous shifted conjugacy problem and its analogue for generalized shifted conjugacy may be treated by similar methods as in [7, 8] . Though these solutions provide only deterministic algorithms with exponential worst case complexity, they may still affect the security of Protocol 1 if we use such LD-systems in braid groups as platform LD-systems. Moreover, efficient heuristic approaches to the shifted conjugacy problem were developed in [12, 13] . Therefore, we doubt whether an instantiation of Protocol 1 using shifted conjugacy in braid groups provides a secure KEP.
Protocol 2
Here we propose a natural instantiation of Protocol 2 using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Consider the following natural partial multi-LD-system .B 1 ; O A [ O B / in braid groups.
Let 1 < q 1 < q 2 < p such that q 1 ; p q 2 3. Let any ˛2 O A be of the form
x ˛y D @ p .x 1 /˛@ p .y/x with˛D˛1 p;p˛2 for some˛1 2 B q 1 ,˛2 2 B q 2 . Analogously, any ˇ2 O B is of the form x ˇy D @ p .x 1 /ˇ@ p .y/x withˇDˇ1 p;pˇ2 for someˇ1 2 @ q 2 .B p q 2 /,ˇ2 2 @ q 1 .B p q 1 /. Since OE˛1;ˇ1 D OE˛1;ˇ2 D OEˇ1;˛2 D 1;
equations (4) and (5) are satisfied. Note that, if in addition we have OE˛1;˛2 D OEˇ1;ˇ2 D 1;
then .B 1 ; ˛; ˇ/ is a bi-LD-system according to Proposition 2.11 (c). But in general these additional commutativity relations do not hold for our choice of standard parabolic subgroups as domains for˛1;˛2;ˇ1;ˇ2. Note that, if we restrict˛2;ˇ2 to @ q 1 .B q 2 q 1 /, then these additional relations are enforced. Anyway, they are not necessary for (4), (5) to hold. In either case,˛2 does not need to commute withˇ2. Then Alice and Bob perform the protocol steps of Protocol 2 for the partial multi-LD-system .B 1 ; O A [ O B / as described in Section 4.1.
The deterministic algorithms from [7, 8] do not affect the security of this instantiation of Protocol 2, because the operations are part of the secret. More precisely,
